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Book Reyiew 
Euthanasia Examined 
John Keown, ed. 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, xv, 340 
The prevailing wisdom in Europe (with the exception of the 
Netherlands) and perhaps North America regarding Euthanasia and its 
legalization finds expression, I believe, in the Report of the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics of 1993-94.1 The following 
seven propositions drawn from that report2 summarize that wisdom or 
strategy: 
1) Euthanasia is "the deliberate intervention undertaken with the 
express intention of ending life." (Section 18)3 See also Section 20 
(99). 
In other words, for purposes of legislation euthanasia is 
conceived narrowly as voluntary active euthanasia. In this respect there 
appears to be little difference between Dutch, English, and American 
proposals. 
2) Euthanasia thus understood weakens "society's prohibition of 
intentional killing" which is the" cornerstone of law and of social 
relationships" and "protects each one of us impartially, embodying 
the beliefthat all are equal." (Section 237 [102]). 
Voluntary passive euthanasia, conceded by almost everyone to 
be the moral equivalent of voluntary active euthanasia (since it is the 
intentional killing of another person by omission) is left in moral limbo 
or permitted and even encouraged under the aegis of the patient's legal 
(and, according to some, moral) right to self-determination or 
autonomy. Even the prohibition against voluntary active euthanasia is 
weakened by recommendations such as that in the Walton report 
(section 261) to abolish the mandatory life sentence for murder. 
3) Although voluntary active euthanasia may be morally 
appropriate in some individual cases and appear to justify some 
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modification in the law, a legal policy that would accommodate 
these cases would have "serious and widespread repercussions". 
(Section 238) One reason for this is that "issues of life and death 
do not limit themselves to clear definition, and without that it 
would not be possible to frame adequate safeguards against non-
voluntary euthanasia if voluntary euthanasia were to be legalized." 
(ibid) Thus it would be "next to impossible to ensure that all acts 
of euthanasia were truly voluntary, and that any liberalisation of 
the law was not abused." (ibid) Creating a legal exception to the 
general prohibition of intentional killing would "inevitably open 
the way to its further erosion whether by design, by inadvertence, 
or by the human tendency to test the limits of any regulation." 
(ibid) If these dangers were to be actualized they would outweigh 
any problems that decriminalization sought to address. 
According to tIns line of reasoning, voluntary euthanasia is not 
always unethical. If a law could be fonnulated that would be so precise 
and strict that we could be sure that all the justificatory conditions for 
voluntary euthanasia were met, then there could be no objection to 
changing the law. Unfortunately, it is extremely doubtful that these 
conditions could be met. One need only point to the Dutch experience 
to be convinced of the merits of the slippery slope argument even it its 
empirical fonn.4 Partisans of this view seem willing to admit that some 
people's lives can be judged not to be a "benefit" or even to be harmful 
to them but argue on utilitarian grounds that such a benefit ought not to 
be legally available. And so the law ought to treat everyone as if they 
were equal in human dignity when in fact they are not. 
4) Besides the concern that legalized voluntary euthanasia will pass 
over into nonvoluntary euthanasia, there is also the worry that 
"vulnera6le peop e - the ehterly;-Ionely, sick-or-d-ist .. essed--,,--wo-uld-
feel pressure, whether real or imagined, to request early death." 
(section 239) 
5) As for the fear some patients have of "aggressive medical 
treatment beyond the point at which the individual felt that 
continued life was no longer a benefit but a burden" (Section 240), 
there is now a "steadily emerging" consensus that "life-prolonging 
treatment may be withdrawn or not initiated." (ibid) 
The Committee is not referring here to the well-known (if not 
always properly understood) principle that futile or excessively 
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burdensome treatment is not morally required. Instead it seems to be 
saying that although a person who feels his life is "no longer a benefit 
but a burden" ought not to be actively killed he ought to be allowed,Jor 
that very reason, to die. This clearly implies that the Committee thinks' 
that the law oUght to go along with such a person's self-estimate and 
that passive euthanasia, unlike active euthanasia, for some unstated 
reason does not violate the principle of equality in his case. In this way 
the Committee, as Luke Gormally points out in Chapter 10 of 
Euthanasia Examined, left untouched "the intellectually incoherent 
condition of the English law of homicide following the Bland 
judgement." (124) In that case, the Court agreed that "discontinuing all 
life sustaining and medical support measures designed to keep Anthony 
Bland alive" involved "the intention of bringing about Anthony Bland's 
death" but that it did not represent a case of murder since the doctor 
was under no duty to continue feeding because the feeding was medical 
treatment which was not in the patient's best interests. And that was so 
because "a responsible body of medical opinion did not regard 
existence in Tony Bland's condition as a benefit." (121)5 This means 
that as matters stand, the law in England (and elsewhere) is saying yes 
and no to nonvoluntary euthanasia - you can't intentionally kill by a 
positive act but you can by omission. The Walton Committee does not 
explicitly recommend intentional nonvoluntary euthanasia but only 
because the Committee's stipulative definition of euthanasia in Section 
20 allows it to evade the reality of intentional killing by omission. Still 
it allows a principle to be introduced into the law according to which 
some people's lives may be judged, either by themselves or by a 
"responsible body of medical opinion", not to be a "benefit" or to be "in 
their best interests". Had Tony Bland written an advance directive6 
expressing "refusal of any treatment or procedure which would require 
the consent of the patient if competent" (Section 263) the Committee 
would allow this as a legitimate exercise of personal autonomy. But, 
more than this, it provides no logical grounds for refusing such a 
"benefit" even to noncompetent patients who leave no "living wills". 
Gormally points out that the Commission is similarly blind to the 
reality of suicide by planned omission. The Report strongly endorses 
"the right of the competent patient to refuse consent to any medical 
treatment, for whatever reason". (Section 234) There is not sufficient 
recognition in the Report of the unlawfulness, ifnot the criminality, of 
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suicide. 
Doctors who practice passive nonvoluntary euthanasia on the 
noncompetent such as Tony Bland are only too happy to point to those 
ethicists and judges who, with logical inconsistency, think it wrong to 
actively kill those whom they think devoid of any meaningful life but 
right to kill them by omission. Thus, Bryan Jennett (See Chapter 12 of 
Euthanasia Examined) points to the Bland case where "the judges 
emphasized, as had several US judges before them, that a decision to 
allow withdrawal of life support from a vegetative patient has nothing 
to do with euthanasia." (169) Jennett maintains that "the decision to let 
a vegetative patient die by withdrawing tube-feeding is a logical 
extension of what has become a widely accepted medical practice that 
is supported by ethicists and is not challenged by lawyers - namely the 
withholding or withdrawal of treatment considered of no benefit to a 
patient and therefOic not in his best interests." (170) Naturally Jennett, 
like his Dutch colleagues, uses "euthanasia" to mean "an active 
intervention intended to bring about the death of the patient". (170) He 
seems to see a morally significant distinction between this and omitting 
treatment with the same intent, viz., to bring an end to "a life devoid of 
almost all the attributes of a human being ... " (179) Those who think 
that "life of any kind is in itself a benefit" are branded "vitalists". 
(ibid.) Jennett puts himself on the side of what he considers a majority 
of people in Western countries who "believe that prolonging life in a 
vegetative state is not a benefit." (ibid) 7 
6) "[TJhe pain and distress of terminal illness can be adequately 
relieved in the vast majority of cases" (Section 241) by palliative 
care. 
7) In the "small and diminishing number of cases in which pain 
and oistress cannoC l>e satisfactorily controlled", analgesi~ .. ---
sedative drugs in increasing doses may be given to relieve pain or 
distress. These may shorten life but if they are given "with no 
intention to kill" and "in accordance with responsible medical 
practice with the objective of relieving pain or distress" (Section 
242) they may be justified. 
The preceding seven propositions seem to represent the 
prevailing wisdom in the matter of euthanasia and its legislation. For 
many they represent a "moderate" view that avoids the extreme 
positions of those who, on the one hand, wish to have voluntary active 
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and passive euthanasia decriminalized and of those who, on the other 
hand, wish to see it subject to criminal sanctions. Of course, this 
"moderate" position will be seen as inadequate by those at either so-
called extreme. At bottom, what is at stake here is one's ethical 
position on euthanasia and how the law ought to reflect one's moral 
position. More fundamentally, what is at stake is one's whole way of 
thinking of moral and legal issues generally as well as one's 
understanding of the human person whose rights it is the job of ethics 
to discern and the role of law to protect. 
Some of these foundational issues are studied in the first six 
chapters of Euthanasia Examined. John Harris (Professor of Applied 
Philosophy in the University of Manchester) and John Finnis (Professor 
of Law and Legal Philosophy in the University of Oxford) have at each 
other over the moral permissibility of voluntary euthanasia.8 
Differences between the two appear already at the level of the definition 
of euthanasia and this difference is closely connected to philosophical 
disagreements which go beyond the particular moral issue of 
euthanasia. Finnis and Harris have different philosophies of action, 
different philosophical anthropologies, and different ethical and 
metaethical theories. 
Harris defines euthanasia as the "decision that a life will end 
when it could be prolonged"(6). Finnis's definition is significantly 
different since it links the decision, not just to the event of death, but to 
the intention and action of killing. A person who engages in euthanasia 
decides to kill that person at that person's request (if it is voluntary 
euthanasia) on the ground or for the reason "that one's human life in 
certain conditions or circumstances retains no intrinsic value or dignity, 
or on balance no net value, so that one's life is not worth living and one 
would be better off dead" or "that the world will be a better place if 
one's life were intentionally terminated." (70) Finnis carefully 
distinguishes euthanasia as the intentional killing of another person 
(whether by commission or omission) from 1) the use of drugs which 
cause death as a side effect; 2) longing for death; and 3) decisions to 
decline life-saving or life-sustaining forms of treatment because they 
choose to avoid the burdens (v.g. pain, disfigurement, expense) 
imposed by such treatment, and accept the earlier onset of their death 
as a side effect of that choice. 
Harris cannot agree with Finnis's understanding of the moral 
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significance of intention and argues that "we are also and equally 
responsible for the things we, voluntarily, bring about, for the things 
that are the consequences of our free choice ... " (36-37). Finnis agrees 
that we are often gravely responsible for what he calls the side effects 
(Harris prefers "consequences") of what we do. However, he maintains 
that our responsibility for them is governed by moral norms different 
from those applicable to our intending and choosing ends and means. 
He would grant that a person who drinks excessively is responsible not 
only for getting drunk but also for the hangover or liver disease which 
was consequent upon getting drunk. But he would not draw Harris's 
conclusion that he chose not only to get drunk but also the hangover 
and the liver disease and that he is therefore equally responsible for 
both. Harris is led by such an analysis to conclude that when 
Parliament, for example, chooses to spend funds on education which 
might have been spent on life-saving surgery it is choosing and 
implementing a program of euthanasia (53, 54). On his analysis 
Parliament makes two choices - to spend money on education and (by 
omission) to kill people. It may intend only to spend funds on 
educ,ation. But that is not what is morally significant. Moral 
significance attaches to choice and, according to him, the choice is both 
to spend funds on education and (by omission) to end the lives of 
certain people. 
That is why Harris sees no morally significant difference in the 
distinction drawn by Finnis between "choosing to kill someone with 
drugs .. .in order to relieve them of their pain and suffering, and choosing 
to relieve someone of their pain by giving drugs, in a dosage 
determined by the drugs' capacity for pain relief, foreseeing that the 
drugs in that dosage will cause death in say three days." According to 
Harris "in each case the drugs have-been-administered to controLpain 
and to bring about the death which will permanently end irremediable ~ 
suffering ... " (38) In another context, a person who knowingly causes 
his own death as the result of an action that is meant or intended to save 
someone else's life is equally responsible for the lives saved and the life 
(his own) lost. His action could be accurately described as one of 
choosing to kill oneself (suicide) knowing that others would live or in 
order that others may live. Harris's analysis is consistent with the view 
that Jesus's and Thomas More's and Maximilian Kolbe's sacrifices of 
their lives were in fact noble acts of suicide. The reason is that we are 
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"responsible for the whole package of consequences We know will 
result from the choices we make. We cannot...evade responsibility by 
only narrowly intending some of the consequences of our choices. We 
are responsible for the consequences of our choices because we know 
the sorts of world these consequences will help shape." (40) What 
counts is not whether or not someone's death should be intended or 
merely foreseen as a consequence but "whether or not this death is 
morally permissible in these circumstances however caused". (39) As 
Finnis points out, this amounts to determining not whether killing is 
wrong but whether first and foremost the person's life is worth living 
or not, or at least whether the person's life has net worth, all things 
considered. 
Harris and Finnis are also at odds regarding the nature and value 
of the human person. Harris defines a person as a "creature capable of 
valuing its own existence." (9) It is not human life or membership in 
the biological species homo sapiens that is special. There are many 
human beings who are not persons since they are not capable of valuing 
their existence, v.g., the human embryo or the newborn infant (9) and 
there are many human beings who have ceased to be persons, v.g., 
people in a persistent vegetative state because they have lost their 
capacity to value their existence. For all that, Harris denies that he is 
a dualist. In PVS the body, as in death, has ceased to be the body of a 
person. "It is a living human body (as in a sense it often is when brain 
death is diagnosed on a life-support system - it is warm, the blood 
circulates and so on, but it is not the living human body of a 
person. "(42)9 
Also, valuing one's life is not to be understood as recognizing 
a value that one's (and, presumably, by extension another's) life has 
independently of one's evaluation of it as such. Harris quite explicitly 
adopts a Sartrean metaethics of value: "The value of our lives is the 
value we give to our lives. And we do this, so far as this is possible at 
all, by shaping our lives for ourselves." (II) On this conception, our 
bodily being, our life, is simply raw material that must be formed or 
"shaped" by our choices. Without the will's bestowal of value, the 
human body has no personal meaning whatsoever. It is the imprint on 
it of our autonomous will that gives "to each life its own special and 
peculiar value." (11) 
Respect for persons, according to Harris, comes down to respect 
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for their autonomy, for their ability to create their own lives out of 
competing conceptions of how and why to live. Concern for people's 
welfare, or concern for the intrinsic value of life, or respect for "critical 
interests" must be (if it is not to degenerate into paternalism) either 
subordinate to or reducible to respect for their wishes to create their 
own lives for themselves. My welfare, my value, my critical interests 
are tantamount to "[my] own conviction as to what is in [my] critical 
interests" (15) or "opinions about what it means for [my] life to go 
well." (16) 
Finnis has a quite different understanding of the human person 
and of his value. For him, a human being does not become (or cease to 
be) a person when it has acquired (or lost) the immediate capacity to be 
self-conscious or to choose or to value life. A human being in its early 
stages is not a potential person that becomes an actual person when it 
acquires the immediate capacity to think and choose and speak, etc., 
any more than a human being in its early stages is a potential animal 
which becomes an actual animal when it acquires the immediate 
capacity to see, hear, smell, feel pain, etc. From the start the human 
being is a person in virtue of its radical capacity as the kind of being it 
is to develop over time its biological, psychological and intellectual 
volitional structures and their attendant abilities. The radical capacity 
characteristic of the human embryo is not the mere passive capacity of 
materials that can be whipped into shape either by the environment or 
by human intelligence. Nor is it like the more proximate but still 
passive capacity of sperm/ovum to become a zygote human being. By 
itself neither a sperm nor an ovum ever develops to become a fetus, 
infant, child, etc. Nor does the development of any living thing have 
an analogue in the technical world of human making. The early stages 
ofuny-living-thing-are-neither-bluepri-nts flor-building materials-Bricks. __ _ 
do not develop into houses and blueprints remain external to the '1 
finished product. It makes sense to see the development from zygote 
or embryo to fetus to infant in the same light as the development of 
infant to child to adolescent to adult. An infant and adolescent are 
potential adults, but they are not potential human beings or persons. 
And so the zygote or embryo is a potential infant and child and 
adolescent, etc., but they are not potential human beings or persons. 
All of these are stages in the biography of one being - the human being 
or person. So when Finnis says that the human embryo is capable of 
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v.g. valuing he is saying that it has "a nature of the kind whose 
flourishing involves such valuing, whether or not an individual or (sic) 
such a nature happens to be in a position to exercise those capacities." 
(48) In that sense, then, "every living human being has this radical 
capacity for participating in the manner of a person - intelligently and 
freely - in human goods." (41) Any non-dualistic account of the human 
person must view one's humanity as one's radical capacity "for human 
metabolism, human awareness, feelings, imagination, memory, 
responsiveness and sexuality, and human wondering, relating and 
communicating, deliberating, choosing and acting." (31) These quite 
different activities, including the intellectual volitional are all 
specifically human. They represent the flourishing of the singular 
identical human being that began to unfold autonomously from the 
moment of conception. As Finnis says: 
... the human being's life is not a vegetable life supplemented by 
an animal life supplemented by an intellectual life; it is the one 
life ofa unitary being. So a being that once has human (and thus 
personal) life will remain a human person while that life (the 
dynamic principle for that being's integral organic functioning) 
remains -Le. until death. Where one's brain has not yet 
developed, or has been so damaged as to impair or even destroy 
one's capacity for intellectual acts, one is an immature or 
damaged human person." (3 1) 
Of course, it is a human being's radical capacity to think and deliberate 
and choose that allows us to speak of it as a person. Still human bodily 
life is not "mere habituation, platform or instrument for the human 
person or spirit. "(32) 
Human bodily life is essentially the life of a person. A human 
person cannot be distinguished, let alone separated, from human bodily 
life. It follows that human bodily life is an intrinsic and basic personal 
good. Whereas in Harris's view (and, it would appear, in that of the 
medical ethics establishment) human life is not a good or value 
independently of the creative human will which alone is good and 
decrees what is good elsewhere1o, in Finnis's "Sanctity of Human Life" 
ethics human life is a good or value independently of the creative 
human will. According to Harris, people are wronged by being killed 
only if they are thereby deprived of something they value. Only if their 
lives are lent a value by their creative wills do they deserve respect. For 
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Harris, suicide and voluntary euthanasia are simply the individual's 
attempt to create his own life by creating its ending also. (11)11 Finnis 
and others in this volume present another consideration. It is this: both 
the person who asks for and the one who assists (in assisted suicide) or 
does the actual killing (in euthanasia) must proceed on one or both of 
two philosophically and morally erroneous judgements that has serious 
implications for others: 1) that human life in certain conditions or 
circumstances retains no intrinsic value and dignity (or as he makes 
more precise later on [70] no net value), so that one's life is not worth 
living and one would be better off dead or 2) that the world would be 
a better place if one's life were intentionally terminated. "I want to die! 
My life is worthless!" says the patient. "I agree! Your life is indeed 
worthless! You are right to want an end to it!" says, at least implicitly, 
the doctor (or whoever). But these judgements (whether true or false) 
cannot be limited to one's own case and circumstances. For example, 
the first judgement claims that death is no harm (indeed may be a 
benefit) and that being killed is no wrong. So it cannot in logic rule out 
non-voluntary and even involuntary euthanasia. The same holds for the 
second judgement. 12 
Although Finnis belongs to the so-called Sanctity of Human 
Life ethical human tradition and rules out as always morally wrong the 
intentional killing of innocent people, he is not a vitalist if by that is 
meant someone who thinks that there are no limits in one's obligation 
to prolong human life. There is, of course, a positive obligation to 
prolong human life, but like all positive obligations, there are limits. 
Thus, while it is wrong to intentionally kill people in PVS (either by 
commission or omission), the care to be provided them need be no 
more than is provided to anyone and everyone for whom one has any 
respect and responsioility - the food, water anu-deaning-that one GaR. 
provide at home. To do otherwise would manifest a choice to proceed 
on the basis that such persons are better off dead - that their lives are 
not equal in value and worth with that of everyone else's and that they 
do not have an equal right to life. (33)13 
In chapter 7 Kenneth Boyd, without a trace of rational argument 
or sense of ambiguity, tells us that he accepts "that there are some 
rational suicides, and by extension that some requests for euthanasia are 
also rational." (78) He means, I believe, that some requests for suicide 
and euthanasia are not only made by sane people but are also ethically 
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justified, although he offers no argument for either. His "modest" 
proposal is that a way be found for determining whether or not a 
particular request can be justified - a conversational method that 
supposedly addresses the singular, individual, unique person and his 
circumstances. In her case for legalizing voluntary euthanasia in 
Chapter 8, Jean Davies tells us that public opinion (including that of the 
religiously affiliated), the increased importance of personal autonomy, 
the demographic factor of our aging population and the continuing 
development of medical technology for "extending our dying" all point 
in the direction of changing the law against voluntary euthanasia. 
Davies would like to see the "sanctity of human life" principle replaced 
by the "respect for human life" principle as long as one distinguishes 
between "being alive and having a life". She cites Lord Justice 
Hoffman's judgement: "the stark reality is that Anthony Bland is not 
living a life at all." (88) As for the advances made by the hospice 
movement, Davies thinks that "there are still many people who do not 
want to go on to the bitter end and do not see why that should be 
required of them." (ibid) Davies would welcome the legalization of 
assisted suicide as a first step towards the decriminalization of 
"properly practised" (89) voluntary euthanasia. 
In this connection she points to the "guidelines" for what she 
considers to be the "careful practice" of euthanasia in the Netherlands. 
Two of the most important provisos are the explicit and deliberate 
request for euthanasia on the part of the patient and the check by a 
second doctor of diagnosis and patient's refusal of further life-
prolonging treatment. She dismisses out of hand the "barrage of ill-
informed criticism" leveled at Dutch euthanasia practice. 14 
Against Davies, Luke Gormally argues 15 with Finnis and Keown 
that "what bears the main weight of justifying voluntary euthanasia 
[viz. that death is a benefit for a person who no longer has a worthwhile 
life] also justifies non-voluntary euthanasia." (127) And so the 
voluntary euthanasia movement cannot dissociate itself from the Nazi 
practice of euthanasia. Their reason to justify (versus their motive) for 
killing the mentally ill, the handicapped, retarded and deformed 
children was that their lives were "not worth living" or were "devoid of 
value". (128) 
Gormally rejects the reigning view in medical ethics (defended, 
for example, by Harris) that "the value and dignity associated with the 
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possession of basic human rights depends upon human beings first 
developing psychological abilities which they retain as presently 
exercisable abilities" in favor of the view (defended, for example, by 
Finnis) that "every hUman being - simply in virtue of being human - has 
the dignity and value recognition of which entails acknowledgement of 
their basic human rights." (115) 
This equality-in-dignity of human beings is also the 
fundamental reason for maintaining criminal sanctions on aiding and 
abetting suicide as well as on euthanasia. A would-be suicide is clearly 
persuaded that life is no longer worth living. But the law, consistent 
with its moral foundation, cannot go along with that self-estimate or 
with the attitude of those who aid and abet suicide and who, in doing 
so, "in effect tell the would-be suicide that his life is indeed without 
value." (116) It is sometimes said that since suicide is "legal" then so 
ought assistance in suicide at least for those who are unable to do the 
deadly thing themselves. However, in decriminalizing attempted 
suicide legislators make the prudential judgement that life is better 
served if would-be suicides got help. To prosecute such people would 
undermine their prospects of recovering some sense of the 
worthwhileness of their lives. It would also most likely increase the 
number of successful attempts at suicide. As for euthanasia, the 
fundamental objection to it and to its legislation is an "objection to 
aiming to cause someone's death in order to put an end to a life judged 
no longer worthwhile." (116) Gormally rejects the grossly inflated 
claims of autonomy or choice. Human flourishing, of course, "requires 
that I make choices, that what I do is my doing, and what I achieve my 
achievement." There must also be some scope for erroneous choices. 
However, there are "no general grounds for respecting every kind of 
s-elf--[arrd-one-couJd-add: other-] destructi-ve e-flG-ic€.-.." (119~_ 
In Chapter 11, Robert G. Twycross, who has worked as a. 
hospice doctor for over 20 years, claims that "it would be a disaster for 
the medical profession to cross the Rubicon and use pharmacological 
means to precipitate death intentionally." (164) In his work he 
considers himself bound "by the cardinal ethical principle that I must 
achieve my treatment goal with the least risk to the patient's life." Even 
in extreme and rare circumstances, his "intention is to alleviate 
suffering, not to shorten life." (166) 
In his article (Chapter 15) Yale Kamisar seeks to hold the legal 
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line between letting die, on the one hand, and direct killing and assisted 
suicide on the other. He claims that the Supreme Court decisions in the 
U.S. lend no support to the right to assisted suicide. Kamisar 
personally thinks that a person has a moral right in certain 
circumstances to commit suicide (as well as to assisted suicide and 
euthanasia) but he argues on utilitarian lines that assisted suicide should 
not be legalized. Moreover, legalizing assisted suicide would surely 
open the way to the legalization of voluntary euthanasia. Kamisar sees 
the logical connections between assisted suicide for the terminally ill 
and assisted suicide for other seriously ill or disabled persons (who may 
have to endure more pain and suffering for a much longer period of 
time). He also sees the logical connections between assisted suicide 
and voluntary euthanasia. Although he does not see the logical 
connection between the ethical foundations of voluntary and 
nonvoluntary euthanasia, the empirical connection between the practice 
of voluntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia is sufficient to convince him 
that voluntary euthanasia (and its logical counterpart assisted suicide) 
should not be legalized. 16 
The final chapter by Anthony Fisher is a scriptural theological 
reflection on euthanasia. In that perspective, the two radical sides of 
the euthanasia debate seem to pit the old self-willed Adam against the 
new Adam sent to do the will of His Father. The temptation to become 
as the gods, to think of oneself as creating good and evil by one's 
autonomous will (Nietzsche) or choice (Sartre) seems very much alive 
among those who clamor for liberalization of the law in the matter of 
euthanasia. This religious ethical world view contrasts radically with 
the religious ethical world view of those who claim the second Adam 
as their model and who believe (not unreasonably) with Saint Paul that 
we are not our "own", that we "belong to Christ". The followers of 
Christ have to stand up to the Caiphases and Pilates of our age who 
wish to wash their hands clean of innocent human life. 
November, 1997 
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